



**QUEENSLAND HEALTH PAYROLL SYSTEM
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY**

Statement of Witness

<i>Name of Witness</i>	Adrian John Shea
<i>Date of Birth</i>	Known to Commission
<i>Address and contact details</i>	c/- Minter Ellison Lawyers, 1 Eagle Street, Brisbane
<i>Occupation</i>	Consultant
<i>Officer taking statement</i>	
<i>Date taken</i>	11 April 2013

I, **ADRIAN JOHN SHEA**, care of Minter Ellison Lawyers, 1 Eagle Street, Brisbane in the State of Queensland state:

A. Qualifications and Experience

1. From 3 November 2008 until June 2010, I was the Executive Director, Corporate Services, Queensland Health. Attached and marked 'AJS-1' is a copy of the position description (TB0).
2. I hold a Bachelor of Economics (Accounting) and a Graduate Certificate in Management (Health Administration). I worked for Queensland Health Services in various management positions from 1994 until 2010. An extract of my Curriculum Vitae is attached and marked 'AJS-2' (TB0).
3. In my role as Executive Director, Corporate Services, I had responsibility for:

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- (a) finance;
- (b) human resources;
- (c) purchasing and logistics
- (d) capital works;
- (e) business services; and
- (f) Queensland Health Implementation of Continuity (QHIC) Project.

4. In or about March or April 2009, the scope of my role changed and I became involved in the management of all areas managed by the Deputy Director-General, Corporate Services, Michael Kaliminos. In addition to finance, human resources and capital works, I also had responsibility for shared services, including payroll and business improvement.

B. Procurement and contract negotiations

5. I have an information technology and finance background. I have been involved in the implementation of a number of information technology systems, mostly finance or finance related. That said, I would not consider myself to be an expert in a technical sense for information technology implementation.
6. My first involvement with QHIC was in late 2008. By that time the contract with IBM Australia Pty Ltd (IBM) had been signed.
7. I had no involvement in the procurement process leading up to the selection of IBM or in the contractual negotiations. I am not sure how the job was scoped with IBM.
8. I have been asked about my involvement with change requests. In particular, I have been shown copies of change requests 60 (TB5 at 88), 61 (TB5 at 96), 129 (TB7 at 22) and 184 (TB 9 at 128) attached as a bundle and marked 'AJS-3'. To the best of my recollection, I

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have not seen these documents until shown them recently and did not have any involvement in initiating or approving these change requests.

C. QHIC Project Board

November 2008 - Early 2009

9. I had very little knowledge of or information about the QHIC Project when I commenced in my role in November 2008. The project was already well advanced. I have a recollection early on of meeting with Tony Price, Director, Queensland Health Enterprise Solutions Transition (QHEST) in an effort to '*get up to speed*' with the project when I commenced my role.
10. I also began attending the QHIC Project Board meetings in about December 2008. The meetings were held monthly.
11. CorpTech was responsible for implementing finance and payroll solutions for the whole of government solution. In 2009, CorpTech was part of the Department of Public Works. Mal Grierson was the Director-General of the Department. CorpTech had negotiated the contract with IBM including '*scoping*' the finance and payroll requirements for Queensland Health. I recall being aware of problems with the system in early 2009. It was my understanding that the major problems related to the speed of the system and integration between payroll and rostering systems.
12. It was '*accepted wisdom*' when I commenced my involvement with the project, that the LATTICE system was unstable. I cannot recall who first told me this. Subsequent to that, during a number of meetings with Janette Jones and Tony Price, I was advised that the lack of support for LATTICE was a significant issue. I do not have details of the dates of these meetings, but they were usually held fortnightly during the period I was involved in the QHIC project.

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
March – June 2009

13. In about March or April 2009, my role as Executive Director of Corporate Services expanded and I became more involved with the QHIC implementation.
14. I became a member of the QHIC Project Board from late 2008 to early 2009 and remained on the QHIC Project Board until I ceased my employment with Queensland Health. Other members of the Board included:
- (a) Margaret Berenyi, General Manager, CorpTech;
 - (b) James Brown, Project Director, CorpTech;
 - (c) Michael Kalimnios, Deputy Director-General, Corporate Services;
 - (d) Jeanette Jones, Director, Payroll;
 - (e) Tony Price, Director, QHEST; and
 - (f) Bill Doak, Project Manager, IBM.
15. Ray Brown, Chief Information Officer joined the QHIC Project Board in early January 2010.
16. Bob McDonald, the Head of Internal Audit was an advisor to the QHIC Project Board and attended meetings in an ex-officio capacity.
17. The QHIC Project Board was not responsible for the technical side of software delivery. The QHIC Project Board took advice from the QHIC Project Directorate, where the technical expertise resided. The QHIC Project Board was provided by the QHIC Project Directorate with system implementation documentation including reports on testing, reports on errors in the system, system improvements and *'traffic light'* reports.

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18. Michael Kalimnios was initially the Chair of the QHIC Project Board however, due to Michael's periods of absence, I took over as Chair in mid 2009.
19. As at mid-2009, there were still a lot of issues with the speed of the system. Speed and volume testing were being conducted by CorpTech. QHIC and Shared Services were conducting user acceptance testing (UAT) given Queensland Health was going to be the user of the system. The results of the UAT remained a matter examined and considered by the contracting parties and the QHIC Project Directorate and the subject of advice by the QHIC Project Directorate to the QHIC Project Board.
20. I have been asked to consider the circumstances in July 2009, in which the QHIC Project Board revised some severity 2 defects to severity 3 defects. The relevance of a downgrading from severity 2 to severity 3 was that the continued existence of a severity 2 defect may prevent the commencement of UAT and ultimately, 'Go-Live', whereas severity 3 defects could be subject to a 'workaround' in the short term and be fixed by IBM following 'Go-Live'.
21. At this point the 'Go-Live' date was November 2009. That the project could not commence UAT had the potential to jeopardise the 'Go-Live' date (which was already under threat). The QHIC Project Board was acutely conscious of the delays to the project and the fact that the LATTICE system was regarded as unstable.
22. From time to time at QHIC Project Board meetings during 2009, the issue of whether a defect was a severity 2 or a severity 3 defect had arisen. For example, on 25 June 2009 the Minutes (TB0) record John Gower of IBM as believing there are 'multiple' severity 2 defects which should be lowered to severity 3 defects and requesting that these be addressed. Again, on 2 July 2009, the Minutes (TB9 at 235) record further discussion on the issue. The Minutes reflect that a document entitled 'QHIC Severity 2 Defect Criteria for UAT' (TB0) was tabled at that meeting by Tony Price. On 9 July 2009, lack of

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agreement relating to the definition of severity 2 defects was one of four key reasons as to why the project was *'reporting red'*.

23. In broad terms, there was a view expressed by IBM that severity 2 defects should be confined to those affecting net payroll only. CorpTech was broadly supportive of IBM's position. Queensland Health through me and other QHIC Project Board representatives, broadly took the view that severity 2 defects should extend beyond net payroll to include a wider range of defects which affected the end-to-end process of rostering and payroll. Thus, the document tabled on 2 July 2009 reflected the effort being made to settle upon an adequate description of *'severity 2 defects'*. The document describes those items deemed to impact upon the calculation of *'net pay'*, but extended to include other items. My view had been that severity 2 defects were not only those that affected net pay, but also included other critical needs relevant to the payroll, such as, general ledger, superannuation and tax. The Minutes of the QHIC Project Board meeting of 9 July 2009 (TB9 at 276) show that Amanda Doughty of QHEST, representatives of CorpTech, Janette Jones of Payroll and John Gower of IBM were meeting at about that time to categorise the defects which were then classified as severity 2 defects. The Minutes record a prospect that the number of severity 2 defects could be reduced to something between 85-120. Attached as a bundle and marked **'AJS-4'** are copies of the documents referred to in paragraphs 22 and 23.
24. Those parties managed to reach agreement on the reclassification of a number of severity 2 defects. The QHIC Project Board Minutes of 16 July 2009 record Bill Doak (IBM) stating that IBM will complete all 113 severity 2 defects assigned to it by 24 July 2009. UAT commencement was deferred by two weeks to permit that to occur. The target date for *'Go-Live'* remained November 2009. Attached and marked **'AJS-5'** are a copy of the QHIC Board Minutes of 16 July 2009 (TB0).

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Mid - Late 2009

25. In late 2009, I took over responsibility for Shared Services. Payroll had previously been managed by Paul Monaghan who took a redundancy.
26. I recall being advised in early 2009 by either Tony Price or Janette Jones that LATTICE no longer had vendor support. CorpTech had arranged for a third party vendor, Talent2, to support LATTICE, but I understood Talent2 had been contracted only for a limited time.
27. By this stage, implementation had been delayed a number of times. There was growing concern that eventually LATTICE would no longer function and a very real risk that staff would not be paid. I can recall being contacted on several occasions in mid to late 2009 by Janette Jones during pay runs and being informed of problems related to the payment of staff on that system.
28. The perceived imminent failure of LATTICE brought to bear a significant degree of pressure to get the new system implemented.
29. In late June, early July 2009 Tony Price, Director of QHEST was requested by me or Michael Kalimnios (I am not sure who) to prepare a '*Brief for Noting*' to the Minister for Health (TB9 at 240). The trigger for requesting the Brief was that we were having significant issues with IBM and the implementation of the project generally. I regarded the matters in the '*Brief for Noting*' as serious. The purpose of the briefing note was to inform the Minister of the significant issues that had arisen between IBM, CorpTech and Queensland Health in relation to the QHIC Project.
30. The draft briefing note was emailed to me by Tony Price on 26 June 2009 (TB0). I began making amendments to the briefing note as I had concerns that the document lacked objectivity and was too lengthy to go to the Minister. Attached as a bundle and marked

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'AJS-6' are copies of the emails between Tony Price and I and two drafts of the '*Brief for Noting*' referred to in paragraphs 29 and 30.

31. The '*Brief for Noting*' was in fact never finalised or sent to the Minister for Health as around this time, the relationship with IBM significantly improved and there was more focus on getting the job done.
32. In mid July 2009, Michael Kalimnios instructed me to prepare a letter to IBM on behalf of Michael Reid, Director-General, Queensland Health informing them that if '*significant attempts*' were not made to implement by November, that Queensland Health would be withdrawing from the contract.
33. The letter to IBM was to be sent on behalf of Mr Reid, The Under Treasurer and Mr Mal Grierson, Director-General, Department of Public Works.
34. On 23 July 2009, I emailed James Brown, Program Delivery Director, CorpTech requesting his assistance in drafting the correspondence. A draft was subsequently prepared and ready for sign off by 27 July 2009.
35. I received an email from Mr Brown on 28 July 2009 advising that Mr Grierson was not '*prepared to be associated with the potential threat of IBM not getting future business...*'. My email in reply to Mr Brown stated '*I will ask Mick to discuss with your DG and under treasurer prior to sending*'. Copies of the emails referred to in paragraphs 34 and 35 are attached as a bundle and marked 'AJS-7' (TB0).
36. I do not believe that correspondence, or an amended version of that correspondence was ever sent to IBM.
37. Toward the end of 2009, there was improved confidence with the new system. Functionality and UAT were starting to improve.
38. Between 25 November to 24 December 2009 I was on long service leave.

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Early 2010

39. In early 2010 the QHIC Project Board made a decision to try to achieve a 'Go-Live' date of 14 March 2010.
40. It was inadvisable to attempt to 'Go-Live' both earlier and later than the March date. There were issues relating to the complexity of the payroll for public holidays (in December – January and around Easter), staff being away in January and the timing of pays.
41. We settled for March 2010, as it was a window of opportunity. If the 'Go-Live' was not to be in March, my recollection is that the next similar opportunity would not have been until June 2010.
42. At the time we locked in the 'Go-Live' date there were still some problems with the system, but the errors identified by UAT were reducing in number. This was the fourth iteration of UAT.

D. 'Go-Live'

43. At its meeting on 22 January 2010 (TB13 at 174) the QHIC Project Board resolved formally to exit UAT4 and move into technical cutover activities.
44. At the QHIC Project Board meeting, there were two briefing notes tabled from the QHIC Project Directorate. The subject of the first briefing note, dated 21 January 2010, was '*Decision required to commence with Simulation 2*' (TB13 at 257). The subject of the second briefing note, dated 22 January 2010, was '*Approval of User Acceptance Testing 4 (UAT4) Exit*' (TB13 at 175). Copies of the minutes of the meeting on 22 January 2010 and the two briefing notes are attached as a bundle and marked 'AJS-8'.
45. The first briefing note recommended as follows:

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'That the QHIC Project Board members approve that a system change freeze is put in place at 5pm on 22 January 2010 and Simulation 2 commences on 25 January 2010 as per the agreed project schedule.'

And it concluded:

'The Project Directorate members have reviewed the current status of the project deliverables and agreed that SIM2 should commence on 25th January 2010 on condition that the ATO Super changes, agreed defects and other Deployable System Readiness and UAT4 Exit criteria are completed by 25 January 2010. The PD members are not aware of any risks in meeting these criteria by the agreed date.'

46. In the first briefing note there is discussion about the Defect and Solution Management Plan. The note reads, relevantly:

'A Defect and Solution Management Plan has been approved by the Project Directorate at the 21st January 2010 for the delivery of new requirements as well as outstanding defects.


- *The Project Directorate members own and will maintain full change control of this Management Plan*
- *The Management Plan includes all known Severity 2, 3 and 4 defects as at the 19th January 2010, requests for documentation updates, improvement proposals as well as new requirements*
- *The Management Plan contains different sections based on the priority of the resolution required and includes:*
 - *Defects required for resolution before go-live (to be delivered by end of business 22/01/10 as per cutover plan).*
 - *Defects required for resolution within the first fortnight after go-live.*
 - *Defects/new functionality required post go-live. A release and resource plan will be agreed with all relevant stakeholders prior to go-live'.*

47. The second briefing note recommended that the QHIC Project Board members agree to allow UAT4 to exit with the process being managed through the Defect and Solution Management Plan. Under the heading *'Issues'*, the briefing note said:

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'UAT test script execution could not be completed by the 15th January due to a number of reasons

- The known risk of identifying new defects was realised

-The agreed delivery of defects resulted in insufficient time to complete testing

- Clarification of issues during UAT and resolution resulted in insufficient time to complete testing

- Some defects were awaiting external vendor resolution (SAP and Infor)'

48. Under the heading 'Current State' it was noted that a delegated caucus of the QHIC Project Directorate had been meeting daily to develop and manage the Defect and Solution and Management Plan and that the daily control would continue; that the Defect and Solution Management Plan was endorsed by the Project Directorate as at the 21st January 2010; that the Project Directorate now holds responsibility to change control and manage the Plan; and that any issues regarding the plan will be raised with the Board.
49. The decisions of the QHIC Project Board in relation to the briefing notes are recorded in the Minutes of QHIC Board Meetings dated 22 January 2010, 27 January 2010 and 29 January 2010. Copies of the minutes of the meetings on 27 (TB13 at 282) and 29 January 2010 (TB13 at 341) are attached and marked 'AJS-9'.
50. The QHIC Project Board relied heavily upon the briefing notes and reports from the QHIC Project Directorate. The QHIC Project Board, on advice, of the QHIC Project Directorate regarded the Defect and Solution Management Plan as adequate in the circumstances.
51. K J Ross & Associates, an IT testing company, had been engaged by QHEST to oversee UAT. K J Ross & Associates produced the *'QHIC User Acceptance Testing, Test*

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Completion Report' dated 27 January 2010. A copy of that report is attached and marked 'AJS-10' (TB13 at 283).

52. I have no specific recollection of seeing the report at the time, although I believe it is likely that I did so. The report reviewed the outcomes of the User Testing Completion process and offered an interpretation of the results to assist in the decision to 'Go-Live'. The report speaks for itself but concluded, relevantly, that it was the recommendation of K J Ross that the project had derived as much benefit from the UAT as is possible given the then current project parameters and that allowing more time for UAT in its current form will not significantly reduce the risks for the system in production (see the Executive Summary). The report continued that the risk for production rollout could be reduced through effort being expended executing a full system and integration test on the application as a whole. The report recognised that this might not be practical.
53. I understood that a full system and integration test on the application as a whole was not practicable due to the size and complexity of the payroll and the way LATTICE and SAP treated backpay.
54. At its meeting of 29 January 2010, the QHIC Project Board (TB13 at 341) considered a Brief for Noting from the QHIC Project Directorate dated 27 January 2010 (TB13 at 321). Copies of the minutes of that meeting and the Brief for Noting are attached and marked 'AJS-11'. The recommendations to the QHIC Board asked the Board to note that all Deployment System Readiness Criteria and UAT4 Exit Criteria had been met; that the QHIC Project Directorate approved the commencement of Cutover Simulation 2; and that the QHIC Project Board had endorsed a proposed process for transporting urgent changes into the Simulation 2 environment. The Briefing Note concluded with the following:

'The QHIC Project Directorate members confirmed that all requirements have been met and that Cutover Simulation 2 should commence as scheduled. The PD members endorsed the proposed change control process.'

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55. At its meeting of 29 January 2010 the QHIC Project Board, in accordance with the recommendation, agreed to proceed and commence into Business Cutover (SIM2).
56. At its meeting of 1 February 2010 the QHIC Project Board (TB14 at 34) considered a Brief for Decision from the QHIC Project Directorate dated 1 February 2010 (TB14 at 143). The QHIC Project Directorate recommended commencement of cutover-technical phase, noting the risk profile surrounding the number of criteria with amber status. The QHIC Project Directorate recommended that *'A full risk profile and subsequent mitigation plan will be presented to the board for approval prior to Gate 2 on 01/03/10'*.
57. The Brief identified all items as *'green'* except for those therein set out as *'amber'*. The Brief concluded that the QHIC Project Members agreed that the abovementioned *'amber'* items were regarded as a *'manageable risk'* and could be completed in time.
58. At the meeting on 1 February 2010, a lengthy PowerPoint presentation (TB14 at 148) was made to the QHIC Project Board, seeking approval on the basis (to use the words in the slides): *'confirmation that Deployable System Readiness Criteria is met; confirmation that UAT4 Exit Criteria is met; confirmation that CR206 has been delivered; Simulation 2 Technical Cutover completed successfully; and that final preparation tasks for Technical Cutover complete have completed'*. To the best of my recollection, the presentation was made by Naomi du Plessis, but I cannot be sure.
59. The QHIC Project Board at its meeting of 1 February 2010 accepted the Brief from the QHIC Project Directorate and approved entrance into Technical Cutover. Attached as a bundle and marked **'AJS-12'** are copies of the documents referred to in paragraphs 56 to 59 inclusive.
60. At its meeting of 10 February 2010, the QHIC Project Board (TB14 at 235) considered a Brief for Noting from the QHIC Project Directorate on the subject of QHIC Project Risk Profile (TB14 at 240). The Brief was given to the QHIC Project Board after the K J Ross

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Report had been tabled before the Directorate. I am unable to say whether it was prompted by it.

61. The Post Go-Live Defect Management Plan (TB14 at 235) was also tabled at this meeting. Attached as a bundle and marked 'AJS-13' are copies of the documents referred to in paragraphs 60 and 61.
62. The Defect Management Plan was discussed and the Board agreed with the recommendation of the Directorate to proceed forward with the Plan.
63. Queensland Health '*management*' prepared a response to the report prepared by K J Ross & Associates. That report entitled '*QHIC Project Management Response to K J Ross User Acceptance Test (UAT) Completion Report*' is noted to be last updated on 19 February 2010 (TB14 at 380) and was prepared by Naomi du Plessis . A copy of that report and a previous version dated 8 February 2010 (TB0) are attached and marked 'AJS-14'. I understand that report and the K J Ross & Associates report referred to in paragraph were both tabled at the QHIC Project Board meeting on 24 February 2010.
64. At its meeting on 24 February 2010, the QHIC Project Board, considered a Brief for Noting from the QHIC Project Directorate on the QHIC Project Risk Profile. The Brief notes that the identified risks outstanding had either been fully mitigated, or had mitigation strategies in place. Copies of the minutes of the meeting on 24 February 2010 (TB14 at 433) and the Brief for Noting (TB 14 at 421) are attached and marked 'AJS-15'.
65. On 1 March 2010, I attended a QHIC pre-Board meeting (TB15 at 13) for Queensland Health Project Board members only. Terry Burns and Shaurin Shah from QHEST, were both in attendance at that meeting for the purposes of presenting the '*QHIC Final Solution Assessment Report 1.0*' (TB14 at 14).
66. I can recall reading the report prepared by Mr Burns and Mr Shah. In their report, Mr Burns and Mr Shah recommended '*Queensland Health enter the production cut over*

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process in order to go-live, provided all the critical milestones within this process are successfully executed according to the planned schedule and that the risk mitigation plan for the key residual risks is actioned successfully'.

67. Whilst there were still general concerns within the QHIC Project Board that there were risks around *'going live'* it was felt that appropriate mitigation strategies had been implemented and that current project risks were manageable. The imminent failure of LATTICE was also a significant driver to *'going live'*. The QHIC Pre-Board Meeting minutes reflect that *'the group agreed that all of the current project risks are manageable and nothing is preventing at GoLive at this stage'*. Attached as a bundle and marked **'AJS-16'** are copies of the documents referred to in paragraphs 65 to 67.
68. The QHIC Project Board met again on 12 March 2010 (TB15 at 146). The only outstanding amber *'traffic light'* related to an issue with the McAfee VirusScan anti-virus software. Michael Kalimnios signed a *'Brief For Decision'* dated 11 March 2010 (TB0) authorising the temporary removal of the virus protection software. Attached and marked **'AJS-17'** are copies of those documents.
69. I was in attendance at the QHIC Project Board meeting held at 7:00am on Sunday 14 March 2010 (TB15 at 166). On the recommendation of the QHIC Project Directorate, all members of the QHIC Project Board agreed to *'Go-Live'* with the LATTICE Payroll Replacement Project. I signed the Brief for Decision (TB15 at 213) on that day. A copy of those documents are attached and marked **'AJS-18'**.
70. I ultimately accept responsibility for signing the *'Go-Live'* resolution. However, I would make these points. First, the QHIC Project Board relied heavily upon the advice it received. Not only did the QHIC Project Directorate comprise those with greater technical expertise and access to experts than the QHIC Project Board, it also comprised representatives of the contracting parties whom, one might reasonably

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expect, would hold each other to adequate performance and who were best placed to assess the status of the project. CorpTech, although not Queensland Health, was nonetheless a government body with relevantly the same interests as Queensland Health. Secondly, while at the time of the decision to 'Go-Live' it was recognised that risks existed, the QHIC Project Board believed and had been advised that the risks could be adequately managed. Moreover, because of the position the project had developed to, the doubts around the reliability of LATTICE and the absence of any alternative course at that point, while the QHIC Project Board could always have decided not to 'Go-Live' there was very little option for it but to do so.



E. Termination

71. My contract was terminated by Michael Reid, Director-General, Queensland Health in June 2010 for 'no reason'. Whilst not expressly linked to payroll, it was my view that this was the reason for my termination.

Declaration

This written statement by me dated 11 April 2013 and contained in the pages numbered 1 to 16 is true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

Signed at  Brisbane Signature this 11 day of April 20 13

Witnessed: 
Name  Signature 11 April 2013



**QUEENSLAND HEALTH PAYROLL SYSTEM
COMMISSION OF INQUIRY**

Annexure(s) to Statement of Witness

Items to be annexed to the statement of Adrian John Shea taken on *11 April 2013*

Annexure	Document	Page No.
AJS1	Queensland Health Deputy Executive Director Corporate Services Position Description	0001
AJS2	Curriculum Vitae	0004
AJS3	Changes Requests 60, 61, 129 and 184	0006
AJS4	Meeting Minutes dated 25 June 2009, Meeting Minutes dated 2 July 2009 and QHIC Severity 2 Defect Criteria for UAT and Meeting Minutes dated 9 July 2009	0050
AJS5	QHIC Board Minutes of 16 July 2009	0068
AJS6	Emails between Tony Price and Adrian Shea and two drafts of 'Brief for Noting'	0070
AJS7	Emails between Adrian Shea and James Brown dated July 2009	0094
AJS8	Meeting Minutes dated 22 January 2010 and Briefing Notes dated 21 and 22 January 2010	0113
AJS9	Meeting Minutes dated 27 and 29 January 2010	0119
AJS10	QHIC User Acceptance Testing, Test Completion Report dated 27 January 2010	0121
AJS11	Meeting Minutes dated 29 January 2010 and Briefing Note dated 27 January 2010	0155
AJS12	Meeting Minutes and Briefing Note dated 1 February 2010 and PowerPoint presentation Gate 1: Approval to Proceed with Technical Cutover dated 1 February 2010	0158
AJS13	Meeting Minutes and Briefing Note dated 10 February 2010 and Post Go-Live Solution and Defect Management Plan	0181
AJS14	Copies QHIC Project Management Response to KJ Ross User Acceptance Test (UAT) Completion Report updated 8 February and 19 February 2010	0198
AJS15	Meeting Minutes and Briefing Note dated 24 February 2010	0221
AJS16	Meeting Minutes dated 1 March 2010 and QHIC Final Solution Risk Assessment Report	0226
AJS17	Meeting Minutes dated 12 March 2010 and Briefing Note dated 11 March 2010	0240
AJS18	Meeting Minutes and Briefing Note dated 14 March 2010	0243

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